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  ii The “Gains” from Preferential Trade Liberalization in the CGE Models: 
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Arvind Panagariya 
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1.  Introduction 
In a series of papers, Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), Bhagwati, Greenaway and 
Panagariya (1998) and Panagariya (1996, 1997a, 1998) have argued forcefully that a tariff 
preference by a country is likely to hurt itself and benefit its union partner.  If the union 
members are small in relation to the rest of the world and the country giving the tariff 
preference imports the good from the partner as well as the rest of the world, the tariff 
preference has no impact on the country’s internal price and hence the allocation of 
resources.  Instead, to the extent of the tariff preference, the tariff revenue collected 
previously on the imports from the partner is transferred to the latter’s exporting firms as 
additional profit.  If the union members are large in relation to the rest of the world, the tariff 
preference leads to a deterioration of the country’s terms of trade.  In either case, the 
presumption is that the country loses from its own preferential trade liberalization. 
A key implication of this argument is that, as a result of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which effectively amounted to one-way preferences by 
Mexico to the United States, Mexico was hurt and the United States benefited.  This view 
has not gone uncontested, however.  In fact, many Computable-General-Equilibrium (CGE) 
modelers, among others, have reached exactly the opposite conclusion.  They contend that 
repeated exercises have shown that preferential liberalization is beneficial to the country undertaking such liberalization and that the trade-creation effect far outweighs trade-
diversion effect.  Robinson and Thierfelder (1999) have promoted this view as follows: 
“The results from a large number of model-based empirical studies strongly support 
a few robust conclusions about RTAs [Regional Trade Agreements]: (1) they 
increase welfare of participating countries; (2) aggregate trade creation is much 
larger than aggregate trade diversion…” 
To be sure, not everyone agrees with this summary of model-based studies.  Thus, 
not too long ago, after a careful survey of both ex post empirical studies and CGE models, 
Srinivasan, Whalley and Wooton (1993) had reached quite a different conclusion:
1 
“We, therefore, see these studies as shedding somewhat incomplete and at times 
conflicting light on the effects of post-war RIAs [Regional Integration Agreements] 
on trade and welfare, to say nothing of what might be the likely effects of 
prospective RIAs.  There seems to be near unanimity that trade creation occurred in 
Europe, but its size and the precise contribution of the RIAs relative to other factors 
is unclear.  Nor is it clear that significant trade creation from RIAs has occurred 
elsewhere.” 
This very different conclusion notwithstanding, the issue remains as to the source of 
the gains from preferential liberalization in the group of CGE studies surveyed by Robinson 
and Thierfelder (1999).  In this paper, we subject the CGE models, based on conventional 
theory, to a critical examination.
2  We argue that when these models generate benefits to a 
                                                 
1 Ex post studies refer to empirical analyses based on data before and after the formation of 
preferential trade arrangements and include assessments using the gravity-equation. 
2 This means that we do not examine the CGE models that rely on economies of scale, 
imperfect competition or changes in ex-efficiency to generate gains from preferential liberalization.  
  2 country from its own preferential liberalization, they do so by recourse to models 
characterized by internally inconsistent assumptions.  And even within the wrong model 
structure, the gains are generated by choosing questionable values of some key parameters.  
If a theoretically correct conventional model is chosen, the CGE models are unlikely to 
generate positive benefits to a country from its own preferential liberalization.  We 
hypothesize that in addition to the structure of the model and parameter values, investigators 
can abuse the specific functional forms used to operationalize the models.  We do not 
investigate this hypothesis in this paper, however. 
Unearthing the features of CGE models that drive them is often a time-consuming 
exercise.  This is because their sheer size, facilitated by recent advances in computer 
technology, makes it difficult to pinpoint the precise source of a particular result.  They 
often remain a black box.  Indeed, frequently, authors are themselves unable to explain their 
results intuitively and, when pressed, resort to uninformative answers such as “trade creation 
dominates trade diversion” or vice versa.  Cognizant of this problem, in this paper, we will 
provide our numerical examples using very simple and stylized models, which are strictly in 
conformity with theory and are fully transparent.  The challenge to CGE modelers is to offer 
similar stylized counterparts of their models, so that others can examine the assumptions 
underlying them. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we present some simple, partial-
equilibrium theory, which must form an integral part of any model of preferential 
liberalization.  Relying on a homogeneous-good, small-union model, we already establish 
                                                                                                                                                 
We suspect, however, that the critique in this paper will apply partially to the models in this category 
as well. 
 
  3 here a strong presumption that preferential liberalization by a country hurts itself and benefit 
the recipient of the preference.  In Section 2, we argue that many CGE models from which 
Robinson and Thierfelder (1999) have drawn their conclusions, are fundamentally flawed in 
that they combine the Armington assumption with fixed terms of trade.  The Armington 
assumption says that goods are differentiated by the country of origin.  If that is the case, the 
goods produced by a country, no matter how small, are not supplied by any other country.  
The country necessarily has market power in these goods.  Using stylized numerical 
examples, we then demonstrate that, with appropriate closure of the model, the results of 
Section 2 remain valid in the presence of product differentiation a la Armington 
assumption.
3  In Section 4, we show that many of the CGE models generate benefits from 
preferential liberalization by recourse to a wrong model and wrong parameter values.  Using 
the right parameter values, even within this wrong model, is likely to lead to losses from 
preferential liberalization.  In Section 5, we conclude the paper. 
2.  The Small-Union, Homogenous-Goods Model: A Partial Equilibrium 
Analysis 
When goods are assumed to be homogeneous, the analysis of FTAs-- as distinct 
from CUs--is more complicated than normally realized.  Under a customs union 
arrangement, both producer and consumer prices are equalized within the union. But under 
an FTA, as Richardson (1994) has noted, while producer prices equalize, consumer prices 
do not.  Free mobility of goods produced within the union ensures there is a single union-
wide price for them.  But the goods imported from outside pay a different duty depending on 
                                                 
3 Alternatively, we can introduce product differentiation via the Krugman (1980) model, 
  4 the country in which they are consumed, leading to differences in consumer prices between 
member countries.  This feature of FTAs gives rise to effects that are more complicated than 
those obtained under a customs union arrangement.  This is shown below, building on the 
analyses of Grossman and Helpman (1995) and Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996). 
Consider the usual three-country setting, with A, B and C denoting the three 
countries.  Countries A and B are potential members in a union while C represents the rest 
of the world.  In this section, we assume that A and B are small in relation to C.  Given the 
assumption that goods are homogeneous, the “small-union” assumption translates into 
“price-taking” behavior by A and B. 
In this section, we limit ourselves to a partial-equilibrium model in which the FTA 
consists in country A removing a single tariff on B but not C.  We begin with the 
assumption that the good under consideration, called steel, is imported by A and exported by 
B. We further assume that, being an exporter, B does not impose a tariff on steel.  The cases 
in which B levies a tariff (even as an exporter) or is an importer of the product in the initial 
equilibrium are discussed later.  Based on the pattern of trade among A, B and C before and 
after trade, three analytically distinct cases must be considered. 
Case 1: Country A Imports Steel from C Before and After the FTA. 
In this case, since the pre-FTA tariff continues to apply to imports from C and the 
latter’s supply price is fixed via the small-country assumption, the internal price of steel in A 
is unchanged.  Consequently, the tariff preference has no impact on the output, consumption 
and total imports into A.  The change brings about no trade creation.  At the same time, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
which is theoretically more satisfactory.  Our results are preserved in this case. 
  5 tariff preference allows B to partially replace C as the source of imports even though its 
marginal cost of production is higher than that of the latter.  This trade diversion leads to a 
net loss to the union as a whole. 
As far as country A alone is concerned, its losses exceed those arising solely from 
trade diversion.  In particular, they equal the tariff revenue foregone on the imports coming 
from B; the more A imports from B in the post-union equilibrium, the more it loses.   
Country B, in turn, benefits from the union, since its exporters capture the tariff revenue not 
collected by A. Effectively, intra-union terms of trade shift in favor of B by the full amount 
of the tariff preference.  Country B’s net gain equals the revenue transfer via improved terms 
of trade minus the welfare cost of trade diversion.  
These results are derived in Figure 1.  The left-hand panel in the figure shows the 
market for steel in country B and the right-hand panel the import-market in country A.  
DBDB and SBSB represent the demand for and supply of steel, respectively, in country B.  PC 
represents the price of steel in the rest of the world.  In the absence of a tariff preference, the 
export-supply curve of B is given, as usual, by the difference between its supply and 
demand curves.  This is represented by EBEB in the right-hand panel. 
Curve MAMA in the right-hand panel represents country A’s import-demand curve, 
obtained by subtracting its domestic supply from demand.  The horizontal line PCPC is C’s 
perfectly elastic supply curve. Initially, A imposes a non-discriminatory tariff at rate PCPC
t.  





t, respectively.  The domestic price in A is established at PC
t.  The country 
imports quantity GS, of which GF comes from B and FS from C.  Country A collects PCPC
t 
per unit in tariff revenue, leaving a net price of PC for both B and C. 
  6 Suppose now that A eliminates the tariff on B but not C.  Steel producers in B now 
have access to A’s internal price.  Since the price in their own home market is PC, they have 
no incentive to sell steel there: they divert their entire quantity of steel to A.  Therefore, after 
the tariff preference, the export supply from B shifts all the way to SBSB rather than EBEB, 
where SBSB resembles B’s total supply curve of B as shown in the left-hand panel.  All of 
B’s demand for steel is now satisfied by imports, while all of its domestic supply is sold in 
A at the improved terms of trade, PC
t. 
By assumption, B’s total supply of steel at PC
t is less than A’s demand for imports, 
so that imports continue to come from C.  With the original tariff still applied to country C, 
the internal price in A remains unchanged.  This means that the total imports of steel are also 
unchanged at GS.  The union is wholly trade diverting: A’s imports from B rise from GF to 
GN, without any expansion of total imports. 
It is readily verified that the tariff preference by A results in a loss of rectangle 
GNEH to itself, a gain of trapezium GNJH to B, and a net loss of triangle NEJ (= UKL in 
the left-hand panel) to the union as a whole.  Country A loses GFEH because it is no longer 
able to collect tariff revenue on steel imports from B, GN.  Alternatively, we can view the 
loss as resulting from a deterioration of A’s intra-union terms of trade: rather than PC, it now 
pays PC
t on imports from B.  Country B gains area GNJH because its exporters are able to 
get A’s higher internal price.  The tariff revenue on the import quantity GF, previously 
collected by A, becomes a part of export revenue earned by B’s firms.  Of this, area NEJ 
constitutes a net deadweight loss due to the higher cost of production of quantity JE in B 
than in C.  This area is the net cost to the union as a whole of extending A’s protection to 
B’s firms. 
  7 An important point that deserves noting is that, though the total quantity of trade 
diverted from C to B is WE =WJ+JE, the diversion of WJ imposes no welfare cost on the 
union.  This is simply because imports from the rest of the world into the union as a whole 
decline by JE (=UL in the left-hand panel), not WE.  With all of B’s supply diverted to A, 
the former now satisfies its domestic demand entirely through imports.  By construction, 
these imports, represented by PCV in the left-hand panel of Figure 1, equal WJ in the right-
hand panel. 
This analysis is extended easily to the cases in which (i) B is an exporter of steel in 
the initial equilibrium but happens to keep a tariff on imports on its books, and (ii) A and B 
are both importers of steel and impose tariffs on imports.  Thus, assume that the tariff in B is 
lower than that in A.  In case (i), the tariff in B is redundant initially, yielding the same pre-
preference equilibrium as in Figure 1.  But in the post-preference equilibrium, as steel 
producers in B divert their supply to A (since, given the higher tariff, the price is higher 
there) and domestic demand has to be satisfied by imports, the tariff becomes effective.  
There is an increase in the price of steel in B, a decline in its consumption, and a 
concomitant loss of welfare.  This loss is over and above triangle JNE in the right-hand 
panel of Figure 1 (= KLU in the left-hand panel). 
In case (ii), the tariff is effective in the pre-preference equilibrium, with the price in 
B exceeding that in C by the amount of tariff per unit.  Under the FTA, both A and B 
remove the tariff on steel on each other.  Since the external tariff, and, hence, the price of 
steel is higher in A, B’s output is diverted to A as before.  The difference with the original 
case, however, is that the height of the triangle representing the loss from trade diversion in 
the right-hand panel in Figure 1 is now measured by the difference between tariff rates in A 
  8 and B.  Moreover, there is no additional loss in consumption in B that occurs in case (i).  
Both results follow from the fact that the pre-preference price in B is already equal to the 
world price plus its tariff. 
In concluding this case, it is important to emphasize that, as far as the welfare of an 
individual union member is concerned, the resdistributive effect of a tariff preference is 
likely to overwhelm the efficiency effect.  Whereas the resdistributive effect is represented 
by a rectangle whose base is the total quantity of intra-union trade, the efficiency effect is 
represented by a triangle whose bases is the change in trade.  Country A, which gives the 
tariff preference, losses potential tariff revenue on the entire quantity of steel imported from 
B.  And if it imports a large quantity of steel from its partner, this loss will be large.  Even if 
the preference was to give rise to trade creation (see the next case below), since the 
corresponding welfare gain will be a triangle built on the increase in intra-union trade over 
and above the diverted quantity, the net effect on A is likely to be negative.  More generally, 
in a many-goods setting, if one partner has high tariffs and the other low tariffs (Mexico and 
U.S.A., respectively, in NAFTA) and bilateral trade between them is approximately 
balanced, an FTA is likely to hurt the former and benefit the latter.  
Case 2: Country A Imports Steel from C Before but not After the FTA. 
The results in the previous sub-section notwithstanding, the consensus view in the 
literature is that a preferential reduction in tariff has an ambiguous effect on the welfare of 
the country giving the preference and the union as a whole.  What is surprising, however, is 
that in the small-union context, this ambiguity almost always relies on the assumption that 
the good subject to the preference is either not imported from the rest of the world or the 
preference eliminates the latter as a source of imports.  The pioneering contributions of both 
  9 Viner (1950) and Meade (1955) implicitly make use of this property.  Recall that in the 
Vinerian formulation, the supply price of the rest of the world as well as the union partner is 
assumed to be constant.  In this setting, if the good is initially imported from the rest of the 
world, a tariff preference has no impact unless it eliminates the latter as a supplier.   
Similarly, the Meade model explicitly assumes that the good imported from the partner is 
not imported from the rest of the world in either pre- or post-FTA equilibrium.  
Figure 2 shows formally how the elimination of the rest of the world as a source of 
imports opens the door to beneficial effects of a tariff preference.  In this figure, we 
reproduce the right-hand panel of Figure 1 with the difference that B’s supply curve, SBSB, 
crosses A’s import-demand curve, MAMA, below the tariff-inclusive price of C (point S).  
Given its large supply of steel, B now eliminates C as a source of imports into A in the post-
FTA equilibrium.  Steel price in A is, thus, delinked from PC
t.  Instead, the price is 
determined by the intersection of A’s import-demand curve and B’s supply curve. 
It is a straightforward matter to see that the net effect of the tariff preference by A is 
now ambiguous on itself and the union as a whole and, as before, non-negative on B.  With 
the decline in the internal price, new trade in the amount KL is created, which is associated 
with a rise in the union’s welfare equal to triangle SLU.   At the same time, since A’s 
protection is extended to B’s firms, there is harmful trade diversion: the cost of production 
of units ZV (previously imported from C) in B exceeds that in C by area UVZ.  The union 
as a whole gains or loses as area SLU is larger or smaller than area UVZ.  The farther to the 
right does SBSB lie, the larger is SLU and smaller UVZ.  In the limit, if SBSB crosses PCPC at 
or to the right of V, area UVZ disappears altogether and the union as a whole necessarily 
benefits. 
  10 The effect of the tariff preference on A is also ambiguous.  In Figure 2, it gains area 
SKL from trade creation but loses area WKVH due to tariff-revenue transfer.  The farther to 
the right B’s supply curve lies, the closer is A’s internal price to PC and more likely that it 
will be a net gainer.  In the limit, if the internal price drops to PC, no revenue transfer to B 
takes place and there is benefit from trade creation, implying a net gain. 
The effect on B’s welfare is non-negative.  As drawn in Figure 2, the price received 
by its exporters as well as the quantity of exports rises.  It benefits on both counts, receiving 
a net gain of WLZH.  In the limiting case when B’s supply is sufficiently large that the price 
in A drops to PC, it makes no gain but it also does not lose. 
Case 3: Country B Exports Steel to C Before and After the FTA. 
The analysis of the previous two cases shows that the possibility of positive gains 
from preferential liberalization for A and the union as a whole arises only when the rest of 
the world is eliminated as A’s trading partner.  This suggests an even more extreme case as a 
candidate for welfare-improving preferential liberalization: if the partner exports the product 
to the rest of the world both before and after the union is formed, intra-union terms of trade 
cannot change as a result of preferential liberalization by A.  And if intra-union terms of 
trade do not change, the revenue-transfer effect is eliminated entirely.  Any tariff preference, 
granted by A, results in an equivalent decline in its domestic price, with tariff revenue 
transferred to its own consumers rather than B’s exporters. 
As the reader can readily verify, this case arises when EB
tEB
t in Figure 2 crosses 
MAMA at or below point R.  In this case, both in the initial and final equilibrium, B exports 
steel to country C.  The price received by firms in B never rises above PC and there is no 
revenue transfer from A to B.  Preferential liberalization essentially mimics 
  11 nondiscriminatory liberalization with Country A benefiting and country B remaining 
unaffected. 
To anticipate the analysis in the following sections, especially Section 4, it may be 
noted that, in general equilibrium, the assumption that the partner exports its good to the rest 
of the world before as well as after the tariff preference is not be sufficient to rule out trade 
diversion.  There may be goods that are imported from the rest of the world that are not 
imported from the partner and are substitutes for the latter’s good.  In such a situation, a 
tariff preference to the partner lowers the imports from the rest of the world and, thus, gives 
rise to trade diversion indirectly.  And since the good imported from the rest of the world is 
likely to be subject to a tariff, such trade contributes negatively to welfare. 
3.  A General-Equilibrium Model with Product Differentiation by Country of 
Origin 
In assessing the effects of FTAs, CGE analysts rarely use homogeneous-goods 
models.  Instead, they take resort to the so-called Armington assumption, according to 
which products are differentiated by the country of origin.  For example, Mexican, U.S. and 
the rest of the world’s steel are modeled as different products.  Correspondingly, in 
consumer preferences, the three types of steel are represent as substitutes via a constant-
elasticity-of-substitution (CES) function. 
It would seem that once goods have been redefined this way, the revenue-transfer 
effect, which played the dominant role in the previous section, would disappear altogether.  
For in this case, country B must export its steel to both A and C before as well as after the 
formation of the FTA.  Assuming the prices in the rest of the world to be fixed via the small-
  12 country assumption, we are effectively in the realm of case 3 of the previous section.  The 
revenue-transfer effect cannot arise. 
A moment’s reflection shows that this conclusion is based on an incorrect 
application of the small-country assumption, however.  The key point, which the CGE 
modelers under review overlook, is that product differentiation by country of origin is 
incompatible with fixed terms of trade.  That is to say, if goods are assumed to be 
differentiated by the country of origin, the terms of trade in the rest of the world or the union 
cannot be assumed to be fixed.  And if the terms of trade are not fixed, the revenue-transfer 
effect, re-enters the analysis through a deterioration of intra-union terms of the country 
extending the tariff preference. 
The logic behind why product differentiation is incompatible with fixed terms of 
trade is simple: by assumption, each country is the sole producer of its products and, hence, 
enjoys monopoly power over it.  This point has been made formally in the context of the 
monopolistic-competition model in an important paper by Gros (1987) and is reproduced in 
the recent textbook by Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan (1998).  
Since many CGE modelers have continued to ignore this important point in their 
applications to preferential trading, it is worth making it explicitly in the context of the 
Armington assumption.  This is done most simply in a two-good, two-country model in 
which each country produces one good.  Call the two countries A and B and label their 
products 1 and 2, respectively. Assume, as the CGE models do, that preferences are CES. 
We know that, in this setting, the optimum tariff of A on B equals 1/(η1
*-1), where 
η1
* is B’s elasticity of demand for imports of good 1.  Of course, since good 1 is not 
produced in B, the import-demand elasticity coincides with the total-demand elasticity of 
  13 good for the good.  What we need to do to obtain the optimum tariff, therefore, is to derive 
the elasticity of demand for good 1 in B in the Armington model.  This is readily done by 
recourse to country B’s first-order condition of utility maximization and the budget 
constraint. 
Distinguishing B’s variables by superscript B, let pi
B and Ci
B, respectively, represent 
the price and consumption of good i (i = 1, 2) and σ
B the elasticity of substitution in 
consumption between the two goods in B.  Assume that good b is the numeraire so that p2
B 
≡ 1.   Using a hat (^) to denote the proportionate change in a variable, the first-order 
condition of utility maximization and the budget constraint, respectively, may be written in 
defferential form as 
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The first fraction in the last equality remains larger than unity, no matter how small 
country A becomes.  In the limit, as A becomes infinitesimally small, the fraction 
approaches unity and the optimum tariff approaches 1/(σ
B-1).  If we assume σ
B = 2, not an 
unusual assumption in the CGE models, the optimum tariff for a small country in this set up 
  14 is 100%; a far cry from the fixed terms-of-trade interpretation of the small-country 
assumption employed by CGE analysts! 
  The feature that the Armington assumption necessarily implies market power 
on the part of each country, no matter how small, has far-reaching implications for the 
analysis of FTAs.  For, with union members’ goods not even produced in country the rest of 
the world, we can no longer fix their prices in the latter.  Any liberalization by a country, 
preferential or otherwise, alters its terms of trade, which must be taken into account in the 
calculation of the welfare effects. 
Once we bring the terms-of-trade changes into our calculations, the revenue-transfer 
effect, emphasized in the previous section, comes back to haunt us.  For, even a preferential 
reduction in the tariff worsens a country’s terms of trade vis-à-vis its partner, thereby 
redistributing partially the tariff revenue to the union partner.  And if the initial tariff on the 
partner is lower than the “optimum” tariff, as is likely to be the case in view of the 
substantial unilateral liberalization in recent years, the deterioration in the terms of trade will 
also be accompanied by a deterioration in the country’s welfare. 
Mundell (1964) recognized this fact in a somewhat neglected paper, published more 
than three decades ago.
4  Assuming substitutability and low initial tariffs, Mundell reached 
the following dramatic conclusions: 
(1) A discriminatory tariff reduction by a member country improves the terms of 
trade of the partner country with respect to both the tariff reducing country and 
the rest of the world, but the terms of trade of the tariff-reducing country might 
rise or fall with respect to third countries. 
                                                 
4 Panagariya (1997a, 1997b) further elaborates on Mundell’s (1964) analysis. 
  15 (2) The degree of improvement in the terms of trade of the partner country is likely 
to be larger the greater is the member’s tariff reduction; this establishes the 
presumption that a member’s gains from a free trade area will be larger the 
higher are initial tariffs of partner countries (Mundell 1964, 8) 
These conclusions closely resemble those derived in the previous section for the small-
union, homogeneous-goods, partial-equilibrium model. 
  To gain insight into how this “large-union” effect matters in determining the 
effects of preferential liberalization, we can simulate a three-country version of the model 
just discusses.  The model itself can be summarized by a handful of equations, using the 
dual approach. 
Throughout, use superscript j (j = A, B, C) to denote a country and subscript i (i = 1, 
2, 3) to denote a good.  By assumption, good 1 is produced exclusively by A, good 2 by B 
and good 3 by C.  All goods are consumed in all countries.  Denote by pi the price of good i 
in the country where it is produced.  To wit, p1 is the price of good 1 in country A, p2 of 
good 2 in B, and p3 of good 3 in C.  Domestic prices can be then computed with the help of 
tariff rates.  Thus, letting ti
j (i = 1, 2, 3 and j = A, B, C) denote the ad valorem tariff rate on 
good i in country j, where t1
A = t2
B = t3
C = 0, the domestic price of good i in country j is 
given by good (1+ti
j)pi. 
Assuming identical CES preferences that are identical across individuals within a 
country but can differ between countries, the expenditure function of the representative 
individual in country j can be written 
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  16 where u
j is the (endogenous) level of utility of the representative individual in country j and 
σ is the common elasticity of substitution in consumption.  The same elasticity of 
substitution is assumed across countries.  Since the purpose here is to focus on the role of 
the-terms-of-trade effects, no asymmetries are introduced in tastes across products or 
countries.  We will return to focus on some of these differences in the next section in a 
model, which abstracts from the terms-of-trade effects. 
E
j(.) contains all the relevant information on the representative individual’s demand.  
In particular, its first partials with respect to domestic prices give his compensated demand 
functions.  To wit, the compensated demand for good i of the individual in country j is given 
by 
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Turing to the supply side, assume that labor is the only factor of production and that 
each individual supplies one unit of labor.  Thus, country size varies directly with the size of 
total number of individuals, which we denote by L
j.  Assume further that one unit of labor 
produces  1 x of good 1 in A,  2 x of good 2 in B and  3 x of good 3 in C.  Letting tariff revenue 
be redistributed equally across individuals, the representative individual’s income in country 
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The first of these terms is the value of output, produced by the individual, and the second 
one his share of tariff revenue.  By assumption, country A produces only good 1, B only 
  17 good 2 and C only good 3.  This fixes subscript k in the first term of (7)  to k = 1, 2 , 3, 
respectively as j = A, B, C. 
The budget constraint of the representative individual requires E
j(.) = Y
j(.).  
Therefore, after substitution from (6) into (7) and combining the resulting equation with (5), 










i u . ] } p ) t 1 {( [∑
=
σ − σ − + =  ∑
=
σ σ = + +
3
1 i





k k C.   B,   A,     j      u (.)} {E )} t (1 p { p t x p 
We let good 1 be the numeraire and set p1 = 1.  This leaves p2 and p3 as the only 
prices to be determined endogenously.  Once again, making use of (5), market-clearing 
conditions for goods 2 and 3 can be written 
(9)  ∑
=
σ σ − = = +
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On the right-hand side, we set h = B, C, respectively, as i = 2, 3.  Thus, recalling that L
h 
represents the total supply of labor in country h, for i = 2, the right-hand side represents the 
total world supply of good 2 and when i = 3, it gives the total world supply of good 3.  Since 
L
j also represents the total number of individuals in country j, L
jEi
j(.) represents that 
country’s total demand for good i.  Summing these over j and taking account of (6), as in the 
left-hand side of (9), we obtain the total world demand for good i.  Thus, (9) equates the 
total demand for good 2 equal to its supply and similarly for good 3.  We do not write the 
market-clearing condition for good 1 since it is redundant by Walras’s Law and can be 
derived using (8) and (9). 
  We have five equations in (8) and (9) [with E
j(.) defined by equation (5)], which can 
be solved for five endogenous variables, p2, p3, u
A, u
B, and u
C.  Thus, duality allows us to 
neatly summarize a three-country model in just five equations.  Taking specific parameter 
  18 values of σ, per-worker outputs, labor supplies, and tariff rates, we can solve the model 
numerically. 
  In Table 1, we present the results of several simulations exploring the role played by 
different tariff rates.  To fix the context, we choose the relative values of L
j and  i x s o  t h a t  
the relative sizes of A, B and C approximately resemble those of Mexico, the United States 
and the rest of the world, respectively.  We report several simulations for σ = 2 and 10 and 
tariff rates of 15% and 30%. 
  Cases 1-3 consider preferential liberalization by A alone.  In Case 1, only A has a 
tariff initially, in Case 2, both A and B have a tariff and in Case 3, all countries have a tariff.  
Within our stylized model, case A1 best approximates NAFTA.  For, under NAFTA, 
Mexico gave virtually all tariff preferences.  An FTA in this case simply amounts to A 
eliminating its tariff on B, holding the tariff on C unchanged.  In all four cases (σ = 2, 10 
and t2
A = t3
A = .15, .30), A loses from the change.  For σ = 2, the reduction in A’s income 
from preferential liberalization is .7% at 15% tariff and 2.2% at 30% tariff.  For σ = 10, 
these reductions become 2.3% and 5.7%, respectively.  At the higher value of σ, the terms 
of trade vis-à-vis the rest of the world shift less and the revenue transfer effect is larger.  The 
tariff preference uniformly benefits B and hurts C.  But since both are very large in relation 
to A, the impact on them is very small.  The results are similar in Cases 2 and 3, with the 
largest loss to A of 6.4% arising in Case 2 for σ = 10 and tariff of 30%. These results are 
contrary to the results CGE modelers reported during the NAFTA debate.  
  Case 4 and 5 present the results of mutual tariff preference by A and B.  In Case 4, 
only A and B impose tariffs in the initial equilibrium while C adheres to free trade.  In Case 
5, C also has a tariff.  Now the results are exactly the opposite of those in Cases 1-3.  
  19 Gaining a preferential access to B’s large market, A is now a big winner.  In Case 5, with σ 
= 10 and initial tariffs in A and B of 30%, mutual preferential liberalization leads to a 14% 
rise in A’s real income.  The effect on B is negligible.  What may be surprising, however, is 
that when C also levies a tariff (Case 5), B actually loses.  But it is an entirely plausible 
outcome: the loss to B from its own preferential liberalization can outweigh the gain from 
the partner’s preferential liberalization.  This is more likely when the outside country levies 
a tariff as well.  For in this case, the optimum tariffs of A and B on each other (and C) are 
also higher. 
  A final set of simulations (Cases 6-8) report on the effects of MFN tariffs relative to 
multilateral free trade.  In Case 6, all three countries levy a tariff, in Case 7, A and B levy a 
tariff but not C, and in Case 8, only A levies a tariff.  Relative to free trade, for σ= 2, a 30% 
MFN tariff by all countries results in a loss of GDP of 11.16% for A, 3% for B and .6% for 
C.  For σ = 10, these losses jump to 18.54% for A, 7.1% for B and 2.48% for C.  At the 
other extreme, in Case 8, a 30% tariff by A results in a gain of 1.36% to itself when σ = 2 
and a loss of .65% when σ = 10.  In the former case, A’s optimum tariff is higher than in the 
latter case.  A key implication of these results is that, at low tariffs, a one-percentage point 
reduction in tariffs by other countries is much more valuable to a small country than an 
equivalent reduction in its own tariffs. 
  These results should serve as a warning to the reader against taking any CGE results 
seriously, without carefully examining the underlying structure of the model and parameter 
values.  By choosing a three-country structure in which one country is very small relative to 
others, even within a conventional model, we are able to generate welfare effects of trade 
policy that are much larger (a decline of 18.54% in income for country A) than these models 
  20 are known to generate.  Furthermore, by changing the value of just one parameter, σ, we are 
able to turn a .6% loss to C into a 2.48% loss, a six-fold increase. 
4.  Generating Positive Gains: Wrong Model, Wrong Parameters 
The analysis and simulations in the previous two sections establish a very strong 
presumption in favor of the view that conventional models yield the following results at 
tariff rates that are 30% or lower: 
(i)  Preferential liberalization by a country results in losses to itself and gains to 
its union partner; 
(ii)   If the union is small and the introduction of preferential trading does not 
eliminate trade with the rest of the world in a large number of products, the 
union as a whole loses; and 
(iii)  The union as a whole can benefit from preferential liberalization if trade 
diversion leads to an improvement in its terms of trade vis-à-vis the rest of 
the world.  In this case, the rest of the world is hurt, making preferential 
liberalization a “beggar thy neighbor” policy. 
These results lead to the puzzle: how do CGE modelers generate gains from 
preferential liberalization to the country undertaking such liberalization in the conventional 
models?  We will demonstrate in this section that this is done by recourse to wrong models 
and wrong parameter values. 
The first trick the CGE modelers use is to superimpose the small-country 
assumption on the Armington assumption.  We have already argued at length that this is 
erroneous; within the usual CGE structure with CES preferences, the Armington assumption 
is incompatible with the small-union assumption, unless we assume that the elasticity of 
  21 substitution in the rest of the world is infinity.  But there is no justification for such an 
assumption: why should individual preferences exhibit such an extreme property and only in 
the rest of the world? 
It is tempting to invoke the Meade-Lipsey, small-union model [Lipsey (1958)] to 
justify the small-union structure used by the CGE analysts.  In this model, union members 
are assumed to be small and specialize in the good they export.  But this justification poses 
serious dilemmas for CGE modelers. The small-union assumption is validated in the Meade-
Lipsey model by assuming that goods are homogeneous and that the products exported by 
union members are also produced in the rest of the world [Lloyd (1982) and Panagariya 
(1997a, 1997b)].  Thus, the model relies on a structure different from that required for 
validating the Armington assumption.  This is a substantive distinction; for, if we assume 
that the rest of the world produces all goods, the assumption that a union member does not 
import any good from it that it imports from the union partner is quite unrealistic.  The CGE 
modelers cannot have it both ways.  If they want to justify the small-union assumption via 
the assumption that the rest of the world produces all goods, they must admit the possibility 
that goods imported from a union partner are also imported from the rest of the world.  In 
that case, they will be faced with the revenue-transfer effect discussed in Section 2.  If they 
want to avoid this possibility by invoking the Armington assumption, they must give up the 
small-union assumption and, in turn, incorporate the terms-of-trade effects discussed in 
Section 3. 
Indeed, we will argue that if the objective is to measure the effects of preferential 
liberalization, the Meade-Lipsey, small-union model offers the least attractive setting.  It 
combines fixed terms of trade in the rest of the world with a structure of trade in which the 
  22 good imported from the partner is not imported from the rest of the world in the initial or 
final equilibrium.  The partner, in turn, exports the good to the union member as well as the 
rest of the world before and after the introduction of preferential trading.  These assumptions 
lead to the outcome that preferential liberalization by a member has no impact whatsoever 
on its union partner and vice versa.  All effects of preferential liberalization by a country are 
confined to itself.  Under such a setting, why should any country form a preferential trade 
area in the first place?  Whatever liberalization its wants to undertake, it can do on its own. 
But suppose we go along with CGE modelers, make the small-union assumption and 
even accept the Armington assumption.  That is to say, the terms of trade are fixed in C and 
that A exports good 1 to both B and C, B exports good 2 to both A and C and C exports 
good 3 to both A and B.  Can we then generate gains from preferential liberalization?  We 
will show that even in this implausible model, for plausible parameter values, preferential 
liberalization leads to losses and, when positive gains can be generated, they are too tiny to 
impress anyone. 
As explained in Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) and Panagariya (1997a, 1997b), 
under the small-union assumption, the central role is assumed by the relative degree of 
substitutability between different pairs of goods rather than the terms of trade.   Before we 
turn to simulations, it is useful to reproduce this point analytically here.  Since a member 
country is impacted solely by its own liberalization in this model, we need focus on only one 
country, say, country A.  Moreover, since the number of individuals as represented by L
A 
plays no role in determining the outcome now (recall the terms of trade are fixed), we can 
set L
A = 1.  
  23 By appropriate choice of units, we can set all prices in country C equal to unity.  
Since A exports good 1, this good’s domestic price is also 1.  Good 2 is exported by B, for 
which it receives a price of 1 in C.  Therefore, A must pay B the same price for this good at 
the border.  Letting the tariff rate on the good to be t2, this implies a domestic price of good 
2 of 1+t2.  Finally, good 3 is imported from C at a border price equal to 1 and is, therefore, 
priced at 1+t3 in A.  With prices in A, thus, fixed entirely by its own trade policy, policy 
changes in the union partner, B, have no impact on it.  By symmetry, policy changes in A 
have no impact on B. 
Following the practice in CGE models, assume that the consumer’s utility function 
is linear homogeneous.
5  We can then represent consumer demand via the separable 
expenditure function e(1, 1+t2, 1+t3)u, where e(.) is concave and linear homogeneous in its 
arguments and u is the level of utility.  Letting  1 x be the output of good 1 in A, the country’s 
budget constraint can be written as 
(10)  u . e t u . e t x u ) t 1   , t 1   , 1 ( e 3 3 2 2 1 3 2 + + = + + , 
where e2 is the first partial of e(.) with respect to 1+t2 and e3 with respect to 1+t3.  
Remembering that e2.u and e3.u, respectively, represent the quantities of goods 2 and 3 
consumed and, hence, imported, the last two terms represent tariff revenue.  It is assumed, as 
usual, that tariff revenue is redistributed to the consumer in a lump-sum fashion. 
The tariff preference in this model is represented by a reduction in t2, assuming t2=t3 
initially.  The idea is that goods imported from the potential partner and the outside country 
are close substitutes on which the initial tariff is the same.  To see how such a tariff 
                                                 
5 For our analytic results, this assumption is not required but it helps connect the model more 
directly to the specific CES utility function used in the CGE models. 
  24 preference affects A’s welfare, differentiate (10) with respect to t2.  After some 
simplifications, we obtain 
(11)  2 33 3 22 2 3 3 2 2 dt ] e t e t [
u
du
) e t e t e ( + = − −  
Remembering that e2 is homogeneous of degree zero in domestic prices, we have 
(12)    0 e ) t 1 ( e ) t 1 ( e 23 3 22 2 21 = + + + +
Solving this equation for e22 and substituting into (11), we obtain 
(13)  2 23 2 3 21 2
2
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This is a familiar expression from the Meade-Lipsey model [Panagariya (1997a, 
1997b)], which also obtains in the context of piecemeal tariff reform when we consider the 
effect of a unilateral reduction in a tariff, which is what the current exercise is about 
[equation (35.5) in Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan (1998)]. 
If all goods are normal in consumption, which is true for our linear homogeneous 
preference, the coefficient of du/u in (13) is positive.  Therefore, a reduction in t2 raises or 
lowers welfare, as the term in square brackets is positive or negative.  If good 2 exhibits net 
substitutability with goods 1, e21 is positive, so that a small reduction in t2 at t2 = t3 raises 
welfare.  But if t3>t2 at the initial equilibrium and goods 2 and 3 are also substitutes, the 
effect is ambiguous.  For sufficiently small values of t2, reductions in t2 necessarily lower 
welfare. 
The intuitive reason behind these results is well understood [see Bhagwati and 
Panagariya (1996)] and can be spelt out as follows.  The reduction in t2 expands the imports 
of good 2, which is beneficial trade creation [see the first term in (11)].  But it also leads a 
contraction of imports of good 3, which is harmful trade diversion [second terms in (11)].  
  25 The net effect depends on the relative magnitudes of the two effects.  Net substitutability 
between goods 1 and 2 ensures that, at world prices, the tariff reduction expands the value of 
exports.  Via the trade balance condition, this fact, in turn, implies that the value of imports 
of good 2 expands more than the value of imports of good 3 contracts.  If the two tariff rates 
are equal, the beneficial effect of trade creation necessarily dominates the harmful effect of 
trade diversion.  But if t3 is larger than t2, the greater expansion in the value of imports of 
good 2 is not sufficient to guarantee a favorable outcome.  For sufficiently low t2, the 
beneficial effect of the expansion of imports of good 2 is necessarily outweighed by the 
harmful effect of the contraction of good 3. 
These results imply that, given substitutability, small reductions in t2 first raise 
welfare but eventually lower it.  Therefore, in general, there is no guarantee that lowering t2 
all the way to zero is welfare improving.  This analytic ambiguity assigns a critical role to 
parameters determining the degree of substitutability between goods 2 and 1 on the one 
hand and goods 2 and 3 on the other. 
Therefore, in the simulations, we need to allow a more general utility function than 
the standard CES utility function used in the previous section.  In particular, the utility 
function must allow us to distinguish between elasticities of substitution across different 
pairs of goods.  This is accomplished most easily by representing preferences by a nested 
utility function.  
(14)  α α α χ + =
1
1 1 ] b C a [ u , 
where C1 is the consumption good 1, produced and exported by A, and χ is a composite 
good defined over goods 2 and 3, imported from B and C, respectively.  The composite 
good is assumed to have the form 
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Observe that the degree of substitutability between C1 and χ is σ = 1/(1-α), while that 
between C2 and C3 is σ
* = 1/(1-α
*).  Thus, the present specification allows the degree of 
substitutability to differ across different pairs of goods.  A priori, we will expect σ
∗ to be 
larger than σ.  The U.S. goods, imported into Mexico, are likely to be better substitutes for 
goods imported from the European Union and Japan than those produced within Mexico.   
This feature plays a crucial role in determining the outcome in the simulations. 
The price of the composite good, defined in (14), is represented by 
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Similarly, the expenditure function, corresponding to (15), is given by 




σ − σ − σ σ π + ≡ + +  
In defining e(.), we take advantage of the fact that π is a function of 1+t2 and 1+t3, as shown 
in (16).  
Given explicit forms of e(.) and π(.) as in (17) and (16), respectively, equation (10) 
can be simulated to yield the effects of changes in the values of various parameters on u.  
Before we do so, however, a key likely result can already be anticipated from our theoretical 
analysis.   In the specific case under consideration, we can obtain 
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  27 In (18b), π3 represents the first partial of π with respect to (1+t3).  In addition, we use θi to 
denote the expenditure share of good i.  Combining these equations with equation (13), we 
can conjecture the following results 
(i) The  larger  is  σ
* in relation to σ, the less likely that the formation of a free 
trade area between A and B will improve A’s welfare.  In the extreme case 
of σ = 0, any finite tariff preference must lower A’s welfare. 
(ii) If  σ = σ
*, critical parameters determining the outcome are expenditure shares 
of goods 1 and 3.  The larger the proportion of income spent on home goods 
relative to outside country’s good, the more likely that tariff preference will 
benefit A. 
(iii)  To produce significant gains from preferential liberalization, it must be 
assumed that σ substantially exceeds σ
*. 
We may now look at some simulations.  Table 2 reports the effects of a removal of 
the tariff on good 2, amounting to a tariff preference to B, with the external tariff at 
15% or 30%.  The results do not report on cases with the elasticity of substitution 
above 2 since the effects are extremely small.  In the first two cases for each tariff 
rate, we assume σ = σ* = .3 and 2, successively.  The net gain is positive, with the 
maximum gain of .41% of the income arising with the external tariff set at 30% and 
σ = σ* = 2.  If the tariff rate is set at 15% and σ = σ* = .3, the gain is .018% of the 
income. 
  More strikingly, suppose we assume a low elasticity of substitution between 
imports from the partner and A’s home good and a high elasticity between the two 
imports.  Setting σ = .3 and σ* = 2, the removal of tariff on good 2 leads to a loss of 
  28 .052% and .145% of income as the tariff on good 3 is set at 15% and 30%, 
respectively.  Switching these elasticities of substitution turns the loss into a gain in 
each case. 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have questioned the results of CGE models demonstrating 
that preferential liberalization by a country benefits itself.  We have argued that these 
results have been derived from models based on theoretically wrong assumptions.  
The models combine product differentiation with fixed terms of trade.  There is a 
fundamental tension between these assumptions: if a country is the sole producer of 
its products, it necessarily has market power.  If correct assumptions are made, both 
theory and numerical simulations are shown to generate losses to the country 
liberalizing preferentially. 
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Figure 1: Effects of a Preferential Removal of Tariff by A when Imports 
Continue to come from C: A loses GNEH, B gains GNJH and the Union Loses 










































Figure 2: Effects of a Preferential Removal of Tariff by A when C is 
eliminated as A Source of Imports: A Gains SKL and loses WKVH, B gains 
WLZH, and the union gains SLU and loses UZV. 
  33 TABLE 1: Effects Preferential Liberalization 
(Compensating Variation as a Percent of the Initial Income) 
 
(Stylized Representation of NAFTA: A = Mexico, B = USA, C = Rest of the world) 
 
σ = 2 
Tariff Rate = 15%    Tariff Rate = 30% 
Case  A B C   A B C 
         
1  -0.78 0.51  -0.31   -2.19 0.97  -0.58 
2  -0.76 0.52  -0.30   -2.12 1.01  -0.53 
3  -0.80 0.51  -0.32   -2.27 0.99  -0.58 
4  4.71 0.16 -0.62    8.63 0.28 -1.12 
5  4.87 0.11 -0.65    9.23 0.13 -1.23 
6  -5.81 -1.33 0.78    -11.16  -3.09 0.67 
7  -1.42 3.05  -2.23   -2.78 5.32  -4.25 
8  0.75  -0.05 -0.05   1.36  -0.11 -0.11 
σ =10 
Tariff Rate = 15% 
 
Tariff Rate = 30% 
Case  A B C   A B C 
         
1  -2.27 0.11  -0.05   -5.39 0.18  -0.08 
2  -2.24 0.14  -0.04   -6.44 0.32  -0.05 
3  -2.16 0.14  -0.06   -3.32 0.37  -0.05 
4  3.18 0.03 -0.08    4.16 0.072  -0.11 
5  5.49  -0.03 -0.14   14.07 -0.008  -0.19 
6  -8.63 -3.58 -0.65   -18.54  -7.10 -2.48 
7  -1.53 1.57  -1.61   -3.46 0.49  -2.73 
8  0.066  -0.004 -0.004   -0.65  -0.013 -0.01 
 
Cases 1-3: Only A liberalizes with respect to B (Case 1: B and C have free trade before as 
well as after the preference; Case 2: B imposes the MFN tariff before and after the 
preference but C has free trade; Case 3: B and C both impose the MFN tariff before and 
after the preference) 
Cases 4-5: A and B form FTA with mutual tariff preference (Case 4: C has free trade before 
and after the FTA; Case 5: C imposes the MFN tariff before and after the preference) 
Cases 6-8: The effect of an MFN tariff relative to free trade (Initially, free trade everywhere.  
Case 6: all three introduce the tariffs, Case 7: only A and B introduce the tariff, Case 8: only 
A introduces the tariff) 






TABLE 2: The Small-Union, Imperfect-Substitutes Model 
 
The Effect of a Unilateral Tariff Preference by A on Itself 
(Compensating Variation as a Percent of Income) 
 
 
σ∗  σ 
Tariff Preference 
   15%  30% 
      
0.3 0.3   0.018  0.062 
2 2    0.127  0.405 
2 0.3    -0.052  -0.145 
0.3 2    0.102  0.315 
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